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Abstract 
 
Purpose – In popular culture, ethics and morality are topical (Giroux 1994), heightened by recent 
attention to the banking industry and pay awards, monopoly capitalism, global warming and 
sustainability. Yet, surprisingly, little attention is given to these in the narrative of the 
conceptualisation of social enterprise or social entrepreneurship – nor in the academic research on 
the sector. Current conceptualisations of social enterprise fail to fully satisfy the spirit of the 
movement which advances a narrative that social enterprises: are more like businesses than voluntary 
organisations; are more entrepreneurial than public service delivery; use business models but are not 
just in it for the money. A focus on the economic implies a business model where deep tensions lie. 
A focus on social capital offers a different frame of reference, yet both these conceptualisations fail 
to fully identify the phenomenon that is social enterprise. The objective of this paper is to fill that 
gap. Ethical capital is offered here as an alternative and unrecognised conceptualisation in the field 
of social enterprise. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – This paper is exploratory in nature - a tentative piece of theorising 
that brings together the authors‟ perspectives on ethical capital to offer a new frame of reference on 
social enterprise. It sets out to investigate some of the issues in order to provoke further research. As 
authors, we felt it important to theoretically explore the concept and discuss several themes to 
provoke a response.  All need further research to tease out the detail. We start by outlining the 
current conceptualisations of social enterprise, then move on to theorising ethical capital using three 
broad themes; theme 1 discusses the levels of ethical capital, bridging from the private sector into the 
social sector. Theme 2 deconstructs the ethics of social enterprise and theme 3 questions moral 
agency through a conventional and enforcing enterpriser or the greater good through a critical and 
creative moral enterpriser.  
 
Findings – This paper very much aims at starting the process of intellectual debate about the notion 
of ethical capital in social enterprises. The conclusions of this paper outline further research 
questions that need to be addressed in order to fully develop this concept. 
 
Originality/value – It is argued that the current ideology of the neo-classical economic paradigm 
pursues interests towards the self and erodes the moral basis of association. The outcome leaves 
society with a problem of low ethical virtue.  The implications of this paper are that social enterprises 
maximise ethical virtue beyond any other form of organisation and as such create value beyond their 
missions and values. This paper offers value in the understanding of social enterprise through fresh 
insight into its conceptualisation. A critical perspective is adopted toward the current literature. This 
paper sheds new light on our understanding of the sector, providing practitioners, business support 
agencies and academics alike with a conceptualisation that has not been explored before. 
 
Key words – social enterprise, business ethics, definition, morality, social capital 
 
Paper type – Conceptual paper 
 
Introduction  
 
We live in an anti-hierarchical age, in which deference to traditional sources of 
authority – the social order of class, the churches, the traditional family – is in 
decline. The ethic of individual self-fulfilment and achievement is the most 
powerful current in modern society. . . . For many people, social progress is 
measured by the expansion of individual choice within this private sphere. This 
individualism is not just consumerist. It is also moral. In many ways this is a more 
moral time than in the 1950s and 1960s.  Young people these days feel more 
passionately and morally about a wider range of issues than they used to – from 
our treatment of the environment and animals, to gender, race and human rights 
around the world. People are more likely to challenge the right of established 
figures of authority to lay down the moral law. For many people, especially young 
people, [these are]  arguments that we need to rebuild a sense of community.  
(Leadbeater; 1997:14) 
Leadbeater‟s account of modern times, the changing nature of society, its values and ethics, are one 
discourse on the social frameworks in which we live. Within the business world there are increasing 
demands regarding the impact of economic activity and on the natural environment. Rhetoric on 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) is commonplace, coinciding with this is the fair trade 
movement, which aims to move beyond rhetorical expressions of responsibility to structure trading 
relationships in such a way that the weaker party is not left at the mercy of market prices (Jones, 
2000; Allen, 2005; Doherty et al, 2009).  These developments are grounded in codes of conduct that 
reflect the morality of the age in which we live.  Many examples socially and environmentally 
responsible forms of organisations are starting to flourish and create an impact worldwide; Ben and 
Jerry‟s; Bodyshop; Timberland; Howies; John Deere; Traidcraft; The Eden Project.  Yet there is the 
question of whether these organisations are actually enacting more moral and ethical behaviours. 
There are questions about the point at which CSR blends then becomes social enterprise and what 
distinctions there are between the two.  
 
Drawing and building on Milton Freedman and his seminal work on business ethics (1970) and the 
principles of staying within the „rules of the game‟ as the only ethical obligation of business in 
society, this paper challenges neoclassical economic ideals and looks at how cultural change within 
organisations is evolving. It also explores the implications involved in merging social mission with 
the culture and turbulence of the market ideology, drawing on Maitland (1997) to gain a critical 
understanding of the ethical trade offs involved in engaging with the hand of the market.  Finally the 
paper conceptualises social enterprise as holding the potential for the higher moral and ethical 
ground in business. What this means, and how this can be capitalised on, is rich food for thought. 
 
We begin by exploring Friedman: 
„There is one and only one social responsibility of business – to use its resources 
and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within 
the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition 
without deception and fraud.‟  
(Friedman, 1970/1993, p. 254)  
 
This „staying within the rules of the game‟ represents a framework for moral evaluation, but as 
Friedman suggests, profits are the primary concern of a business. So is business moral or amoral?  
 
We consider aspects of social enterprise in arguing a case that there is a moral duty in business 
beyond economic rules. Keller (2007) suggests that regarding business as an economic activity has 
left society with a negative ethical base, ignoring consideration of the social costs of private 
enterprise. Concurrently, we now live in an age where ethical values and moral codes are becoming 
part of the manifestos of organisations.  This is particularly true in social enterprises where the 
primary purpose of organisations is focussed on the „social‟ (Pearce, 2003). The „social‟, in the social 
enterprise context, extends to environmental and social action organisations in which utopian moral 
and higher ground ethical positions are taken to have greater legitimacy than in other forms of for-
private-profit businesses.  This higher ground claim, it is argued in this paper, forms one of the 
defining characteristics of social enterprise.  A better understanding of this claim will make a 
significant contribution to understanding and developing the sector. 
 
Ethical capital was first brought to the authors‟ attentions during the opening plenary at Voice 07 
(the Social Enterprise Coalition‟s „trade fair‟ for the sector). The opening plenary included a rousing 
speech by Tim Smit. His organisation, The Eden Project, has transformed the land and environment 
in a corner of England‟s South West and he is further seen as one of the country‟s leading social 
entrepreneurs. The Eden Project is described as a „living theatre of plants and people‟, an attraction 
site that includes landscapes, plants and much more.  In his speech, Smit claims (SEC, 2007); 
One of the most interesting things I have come across recently is that a lot of 
people in the city reckon that corporate life as we know it is going to be dead in 
thirty years. And I would say that Eden would be a good example of why. When I 
look at my top executives, the top eight people who work for me are all people who 
have decamped from very successful jobs in very successful organisations, because 
they no longer want to work for corporations where there is no ethical capital, and 
this is happening all over the place. Nowadays 40% of school leavers apparently 
do not want to work for a corporation. [emphasis added]  
If people are choosing not to work for private or public sector organisations but are instead seeking 
work in the social economy then the need for greater understanding of ethical capital is obvious. This 
paper, therefore, sets out to explore these issues in order to provoke further exploration of the 
conceptualisation of ethical capital. „Capital‟ is believed to take several forms: 
 
o Physical capital (mobilising natural resources); 
o Economic capital (mobilising financial resources); 
o Human capital (mobilising labour resources); 
o Intellectual capital (mobilising intellectual resources); 
o Social capital (mobilising civil society resources); 
o Ethical capital (mobilising moral values). 
 
Organisations may have all these ingredients but the mix between capitals is different across 
different forms of organisation. 
 
A recent survey by the Social Enterprise Coalition (SEC, 2009) attempted to quantify social motives 
in social enterprises.  The majority of respondents had a social, community or environmental 
motivation with the top responses being: „putting something back into the community‟ (45%); „a 
better way to achieve social or environmental goals‟ (24%).  The most frequent responses on „core 
values‟ were: „helping the community‟ (32%); being „socially motivated‟ (31%).  Based on this, the 
study concluded that social and community benefit is the key motivator for those working for social 
enterprises (compare Amin, 2009a).  
 
In the next section, conceptualisations of social enterprise are examined. This is followed by a 
theoretical view of the moral codes underpinning different forms of enterprise activity.  In the main 
discussion parts of the paper, we bridge the two and offer a foundation for further explorations of the 
links between different approaches to ethical capital and enterprise.  In doing so, the paper represents 
initial steps towards the conceptualisation of ethical capital and its place in social enterprise theory. 
 
Current Conceptualisations of Social Enterprise  
The surge of interest in the social enterprise business model has made waves around the world 
(Nicholls 2006b; Bornstein 2004).  The current conceptualisations are based on ongoing debates 
about the business case and characteristics of social enterprises and social entrepreneurs. This 
unpicking seeks to uncover the DNA yet fails to go deep enough. Understanding the value of social 
entrepreneurs and the transformations of capital (physical, economic, human, intellectual, social and 
ethical) is crucial to the development of the field, and the drive for change.  This paper very much 
aims at starting that process of intellectual debate about the notion of ethical capital in social 
enterprises.  In the next section, we set out current conceptualisations of economic and social capital 
before moving on to explore ethical capital.   
 
 
Conceptualisation 1 – The Economic Lens  
Pearce (2003) describes social enterprises as part of the third system, closer to the first system 
(private business) than the second system (public provision), yet primarily social and secondly a 
business. Social Enterprises are described as trading organisations in a market (Pearce 2003). A 
focus and operationalisation of social enterprises as „business-like‟ and „entrepreneurial‟ is well 
documented (Leadbeater 1997; Dees 1998; Nicholls 2006b). Yet if, as part of the third system, social 
enterprises are as Dart (2004) suggests „blurring the boundaries between non-profit and profit‟, then 
what blurs? What is it that differentiates social enterprises from non-profit and for-profit enterprises? 
We question, as other do, whether a managerialist ideology is taking precedence over the social? 
Turnbull (1994); Terry (1998); Pharoah et al (2004); Hulgard and Spear (2006) have their concerns 
but at the fore is a heightened focus or market ideology from funding providers where competition 
has led to greater demands, requiring more from organisations in the non-profit sector in terms of 
management systems, quality standards and marketing (Smallbone et al 2001; Paton 2003; Pearce 
2003). However, the push towards a market driven agenda and an enterprise culture within social 
enterprises is not without its problems. Maitland (1997) raises a major concern when he points out 
that;  
“the market frees individual acquisitiveness from moral, social and/or religious 
constraints. While this acquisitiveness can be a source of great energy and 
creativity, it is also a turbulent, disruptive, and potentially disintegrative force. 
Moreover, the market is believed to contain an expansionary dynamic, so that 
unless it is contained it progressively invades and colonizes other spheres of our 
social lives.” (1997:18).  
Maitland continues to list the charges against the market, suggesting that morality is being weakened 
by the hand of the market; 
“ It releases self-interest from moral restraints. 
It erodes all social ties other than purely economic ones and/or converts social 
relationships into instrumental ones ("commodifies" them). 
 It promotes a preoccupation with narrow individual advantage at the expense of 
responsibility to the community or social obligations. 
It substitutes competition for voluntary cooperation. 
It favors materialistic or hedonistic values.”  
Maitland (1997:18) 
Maitland certainly has a point and social enterprises need to be aware of the tensions in the ideology 
of the market as an entrepreneurial platform. As Maclntyre suggests “the normal operation of the 
market offers people powerful inducements to desert the virtues. If not by inclination, then in self 
defence, people find themselves compelled to conform to market norms of behaviour.” (As quoted in 
Maitland (1997:20)).  How social enterprises practice dealing with the desertion of their virtues 
needs further research. Seanor et al. (2007) provide some light when discussing case studies, 
evidencing the engagement of organisations with the market (through socially constructed world 
views) as something of a „smash and grab‟ – where organisations could be described as moving out 
of the „safety‟ of the social (virtuous) sector into the „wilds‟ of the market terrain (business-like 
world) to win contracts, and then retreating back into the comfort zone whilst delivering projects. 
When considering the sentiments of the theory of the market, it becomes only too apparent what 
social organisations „give up‟ on their forays into murky waters, Keller (2007) adds: 
“economics is amoral in [?]  that it cannot be used to answer normative 
questions like the fairness of the distribution of income. In essence, the 
neoclassical economic ideal presents us with an ethic by placing economic 
efficiency before us as the highest end, and utility/profit maximization as the only 
means to that end.” 
There may however be some hope, as Maitland (1997) suggests, that those who cultivate the virtues 
of the social will be a source of economic benefit1 and may be more successful in the marketplace 
because of the valuable ethical capital they possess.  We will return to this argument later in the 
paper. 
 
Conceptualisation 2 – The Social Capital Lens  
One strength of the social enterprise sector is seen as its capacity to build social capital. Social 
capital is primarily seen as the local-level involvement of people in their community, whether a 
community of interest or a geographic neighbourhood (Defourny 2001; Pearce 2003; Spear 2001). 
Social capital is seen as a commitment to building community capacity, beyond contracted outputs, 
and nurturing the development of valued social networks (Westall, 2001).  
Conceptually, social capital focuses upon commitment and equity (Drayton 2005; Evers 2001; Leslie 
2002). Gupta et al. (2003: 979) consider social capital as „trust-based community capital‟. More than 
this, some claim that social capital is a goal of social enterprise (Amin et al. 2002; Evers 2001) 
rooted in a „relationship‟ view of how to sustain a community and an emphasis on „socially rational‟ 
thinking and behaviour (Ridley-Duff, 2008).  Pearce (2003) identified these values as predicated 
upon co-operation, doing good work and trust. Spear (2001, 2006) states that social capital in part 
arises as these organisations, particularly co-operatives, are collective in nature or have 
representative stakeholders on their committees. Social capital is of value in terms of relationships 
with the individual social entrepreneur, relationships within a social enterprise organisation, or 
between an organisation and the local community.  
                                                 
1
 Here the assumption could be the exchange of other forms of capital into financial capital through rewarding the values 
of the virtues. As Tsukamoto suggests; “A firm can actively create ethical capital by nourishing a market segment of 
ethically high-minded stakeholders who are willing to pay, for example, for the costs of a product that is produced to 
higher standards than required by law.” (2007:218) 
 
 Having explored the potential goal of social enterprise (social capital) and the means (trading in a 
market for social purpose), the next section brings morality, virtuous sentiments and ethics into the 
debate. 
Conceptualisation 3 – Ethical capital  
So what is ethical capital? What is so important about ethical capital? Does ethical capital constitute 
the principal attraction that induces many people to work beyond the need for food, shelter and a flat 
screen TV, by offering a sense of well-being and happiness? If so, are social enterprises well-placed 
to capitalise on this virtue and attract more ethically minded individuals into the sector (as Tim Smit 
claims to have done)? 
 
Tsukamoto (2005) suggests that ethical capital conveys the asset of morality in an organisation. 
Organisations espousing their moral virtues can attract a growing interest of followers, yield returns 
and competitive advantage, as Tsukamoto (2005:77) suggests;  
…once morality is transformed into an economic asset, corporate moral agency 
yields competitive advantage, increases profitability and increases survival 
prospects of the firm. In this respect, insufficient corporate moral agency can be 
analysed not as a systemic, rule-based condition of defective incentive structures 
but as a capital utilisation problem in firm-stakeholder interactions.” 
In times of recession, it is argued social enterprises weather the storm better than private businesses.  
Is this something to do with corporate moral agency within social enterprises?  
 
There is an obvious challenge to this perspective as it rests on empirical data that cannot ever support 
the „proof‟ that social enterprise and social entrepreneurs are morally superior.  Of course, once 
recognising that ethical capital exists, it requires questioning whether it (like social capital) can be 
turned into other types of capital.  By way of example, the pursuit of „Eden‟ as a morally responsible 
commitment to exploring co-existing environmental and human sustainability has in itself 
transformed both the social and financial capital of Cornwall, England.  
 
Shaw (1997) puts the erosion of the moral basis of public institutions and personal ties (family, 
friendships, associations, groups) down to the notion of the free market and self-interested 
maximizations. Keller (2007) articulates the issue a little better and states: 
“It is contended that modern business theory, as represented by the neo-classical 
economic paradigm, has established a moral code of business based on efficiency 
of outcome and the assumed link of efficiency to self-interested behaviour. The 
result is markets as the arbitrators of ethical outcomes, and profit-maximization as 
the ultimate moral code” (2007:159) 
We next explore moral codes in a little more detail. In order to theoretically explore ethical capital 
three themes are presented, all of which are outlined to provoke response, and which need further 
research to tease out the detail. 
 
Theme 1 – Levels of ethical capital. 
In an influential paper Tsukamoto (2007) outlines 3 levels of ethical capital: 
1. Passive unintended moral agency – accumulated through following the rules of the game 
of business. Businesses here are legal, yet may take advantage of labour laws, offering 
employees minimum remuneration, terms and conditions, whilst maximising wealth for 
shareholders with the bare minimum and only a legal responsibility shown for curtailing 
the impact of the enterprise on the environment. Unintended moral agency acquires a 
minimal level of ethical capital – „Good must be done for reason of profit‟ Friedman 
(1970/1993);  
2. Passive, intended moral agency – accumulated through following the rules of the game of 
business, yet more engaged through acknowledging that business exists in a community. 
Customers influence social norms, such as achieving environmental standards or investors 
in people type certifications. This may also involve some acknowledgement that 
employees can be better performers if they are happier;  
3. Active, intended moral agency and the creation of ethical capital. This level is achieved by 
organisations undertaking Corporate Social Responsibility. Body Shop, Café Direct, 
Divine Chocolate and organisations that go beyond the minimum rules of market morality 
link profit to the outcome of ethical thinking and market opportunities. Of relevance here 
is stakeholder theory (business duties should go beyond the immediate and demonstrate 
responsibility to wider groups), based on Kantian ethics. Emanuel Kant‟s „categorical 
imperative‟ as discussed in Doherty et al. (2009), provides a useful starting point.  Moral 
decisions derive from good will in that ethical actions should be grounded by the 
imperative that there is a duty to treat people as ends and not means.  People have their 
own needs and this should not be compromised in the pursuit of profit maximization.      
 
Yet the three levels outlined by Tsukamoto fail to recognise civil society. We propose a fourth level 
of active, intended blended value that combines „social‟ and „economic‟ outcomes through the 
application of ethical capital.  While the first three levels view ethical behaviour as pertinent to the 
accumulation of „profitability‟ in terms of economic capital, it is only at level 4 that it is re-
conceptualised as a way of building ethical capital through the application of social and economic 
rationality.  It is only at level 4 that business ethics are revised to re-frame the concept so that it is 
measured in more than economic terms – beyond bottom line accounting, to a point of looking at the 
purpose of multi-bottom line accounting, and considering what is represented by each contribution.  
 
 
In Alter‟s (2004) model (Figure 1), the sustainability spectrum serves well as a map of ethical capital 
levels across the social and private economies. As represented here levels 1, 2 and 3 represent the 
ethics of private businesses that are primarily based on economic value creation (right hand side of 
the diagram).  The fourth level situates social enterprise by arguing that good must not be done solely 
for reasons of profit. It is the organisations that are primarily social value creators (left hand side of 
the diagram) in levels 4 and 5 where it significantly changes the values base. 
 
 
Level 5
Traditional
Non-Profit
Non-Profit
with Income
Generating
Activities
Non-Profit
funded by
market
trading
Socially
Responsible
Business
Corporation
Practising
Social
Responsibility
Traditional
For-Profit
Sustainability Equilibrium
Social Sustainability Economic Sustainability
Ethical
Capital Level 4 Level 3 Level 2 Level 1
 
Figure 1: Sustainability Spectrum (Alter 2004:8) 
 
Beyond level 4, we might postulate a fifth position that embraces the concept of „charity‟.  In its 
purest form, there is an attempt to remove economic thinking completely from decisions regarding 
social action.  When acting from a sense of charity - literally translated as „love‟ in early texts 
(Morgan, 2008) – the giver receives no economic benefit from the act of giving.  Expressions of this 
value remain embedded in Charity Law through the requirement that Trustees cannot be paid for 
their role as governors in a Charity. It is only relatively recently that charities have had to widen their 
income strategies – including social enterprise – as ways of sustaining organisational missions in the 
current climate. The recent (but not yet available) Charity Incorporated Company (CIO) model is a 
further example of the changing climate (yet the rules on remuneration for trustees remain the same).  
 
Theme 2 – Deconstructing the Ethics of Social Enterprise 
The focus on „superior‟ moral values, however, is not without some contradictions.  It typically 
involves a shift away from the liberal focus on developing individual rights and the pursuit of self-
interest, and more on utilitarian (and Marxian) arguments that “shared values” can be developed to 
achieve a “common good”.  These communitarian commitments are grounded in the idea that „free‟ 
people do not exist and that „rationality‟ is both a precursor and outcome of experiential learning in a 
group context (Blumer, 1969; Tam, 1999).  Ethical decisions, therefore, have to involve the group, 
not just the individual, and involve a consideration of both material and emotional gains and losses.  
Actions are considered more „moral‟ if they consider impacts on both self and others (Dewey, 1957). 
Following Durkheim, Collins (1997) and Tam (1999) attempt to position “liberal” communitarianism 
at the juncture between these two extremes.  However, unitarist outlooks continue to pepper their 
arguments as soon as they turn their attention to business.  Tam argues in a UK context that: 
…companies must learn to treat their workers, suppliers and customers, as well as 
their senior management and shareholders, as members of a shared community… 
[emphasis added].    (Tam, 1999:10): 
Collins, in a US context contends that: 
…the standard should be democratic organizations with a few authoritarian 
exceptions rather than authoritarian organizations with a few participatory 
management exceptions…  [emphasis added]   (Collins, 1997:503): 
Both, however, limit their calls to various forms of representative democracy and legal reform so that 
recalcitrant business leaders are prodded into practising social equality.  Democratic forums, they 
contend, will “prove” democracy as a superior way of organising – a circular argument if ever there 
was one.  Particularly problematic is the recourse to law relying on “rational science” to support 
arguments for progressive social change. 
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Figure 2 – Deconstructing The Ethics Of Social Enterprise 
 
The diagram above (Figure 2) attempts to unpack the notion of the fourth level in ethical capital. As 
is shown here, social enterprise evolves between private and charitable enterprise, as the blended 
balance of capital investments (economic, social, intellectual and ethical).  
 
The theoretical perspective in Figure 2 provides some explanation for the practice of establishing 
separate private and charitable enterprises to pursue a social goal.  The former pursues financial 
objectives while the latter pursues social and charitable objectives.  In this situation, the 
contradictions between economic and social rationality are externalised: the dissonance presented by 
the “other” frame of reference can be ignored or marginalised when deciding on operational 
priorities.  The application of religious ethics (grounded in „saintly‟ behaviour) supports the 
refinement and pursuit of virtue ethics: both share trait theories of leadership derived from visionary 
and inspiring individuals.  This facilitates the unproblematic transformation of business leaders into 
philanthropists (such as Bill Gates).  While the outcomes sought may change, the style of leadership 
and governance that brings about these outcomes does not. 
 
In co-operatives and new organisational forms (such as the CIC and CIO), the aim is to internalise 
the dissonance created by the pursuit of economic and social goals simultaneously.  In this 
environment, democratic organisation and social ownership are gaining salience.  Emergent ethical 
norms (from critical discourse) encourage normative control techniques.  Nevertheless, the presence 
of democratic structures (if upheld) act as guarantor that normative values cannot dominate over in 
the long term: they remain open to challenge and continual renewal through discursive deliberation 
within the organisation. 
 
Yet, can the „profit-motive‟ and „business efficiency‟ really be seen as weakening sources of ethical 
capital?  Alternatively, could either an old or new rationality enable ethical capital to be re-
appropriated and placed within new organisational forms such as social enterprises, so that such 
profit can be put to use in an expanding circle (Singer, 1981) of moral commitment to society and the 
environment?      
 
 
Theme 3 - Moral agency through a conventional and enforcing enterpriser or 
the greater good through a critical and creative moral enterpriser? 
What are „enforcing‟ and „creative‟ moral enterprisers?  In answering this question we shall build on 
the previous sources and develop an analytical typology through appropriation of Becker (1963) and 
Hart (1963).  Becker (1963) suggests that there are two sorts of moral entrepreneur within social 
groups, „rule-enforcers‟ and „rule-creators‟, with the label of „entrepreneur‟ being adopted, because 
he viewed both as enterprising acts.   
 
Given the substantive work done since on defining the entrepreneur (see Entrepreneurship Theory 
Practice Special Issue (Davidsson et al.,summer 2001) and Shane and Venkataraman, 2000), it might 
be best to re-state Becker‟s conceptualisation as „enterpriser‟ so as to not do violence to that latter 
body of work or the spirit of Becker‟s.  What then does Hart have to offer here?  From a utilitarian 
perspective, which in a particular form has sometimes been argued to be the moral framework for 
contemporary business and society, Hart nevertheless suggests there is conventional morality, which 
constitutes that shared by society generally and its organisations, but also critical morality, which 
stands back and asks whether such conventional morality is harmful.   
 
Let us put Becker and Hart together with the little variation of our own for good measure.  The 
conventional and enforcing moral enterpriser  attempts to reproduce and even grow ethical capital, 
but on the basis of MacIntyre‟s thesis, they really have their work cut out.  Potentially in Western 
society then, traditional deference, bits of religious morality, a democratic ethos, and profit-driven 
economics all have to somehow be made to hang together.  One option, like the Lipsky (1980) 
bureaucrat, is that they are selective in the rules and practices they try to reproduce.  Perhaps an 
obvious tactic is to try to stick with the profit-motive and business efficiency, and lose the ethical 
fragments that are out of sympathy with this.  Yet economists themselves (Layard, 2005) are 
returning to moral philosophy, precisely because the profit-motive and purchaser power became ends 
in themselves, detached from what utilitarianism was originally about (like other philosophies before 
it in somewhat different ways) – happiness, well-being, the good life.  While wealth creation makes a 
positive difference in peoples lives up to a point, other things can become more important.   
 
The critical and creative moral enterpriser  has an opportunity to re-engage elements of ethical 
capital in new organisational contexts like social enterprises.  It is a project they could undertake 
through a more elaborated form of naturalistic ethics, incorporating the best of virtue, utilitarian and 
other normative ethical theory into an understanding of ethical capital that takes into account 
continuity and contingency (with due acknowledgement to Hegel and Marx) in the process and 
praxis of moral development and change.  This can justify and bring about more commitment to the 
flourishing of an ever expanding circle of life. 
 
 Conclusions  
This paper has attempted to introduce the reader to the concept of ethical capital. The discussion has 
taken the reader through the economic lens, the social capital lens and introduced the ethical capital 
lens. The debate, we hope, has barely started and further work is evidently required to fully develop 
this concept. 
 
The enterprise-oriented view is of the sector delivering social projects through traditional, market 
mechanisms. By focusing upon income generation, which is seen to serve a social purpose, social 
enterprise becomes placed within a financial framework. The factors driving this approach appear 
based upon the shift to the „contracting culture‟. This is a portrayal of organisations as moving 
towards the economic end of the spectrum, engaging in market activities, increasingly at the mercy 
of the market ideology.  This imagery is surely an anathema to promoting innovative social 
enterprise development. Rather than adopting radical social change as advocated (Bornstein 2004), 
social enterprise development appears to focussing upon becoming competitive businesses in a 
market ideology. Is this what the movement wants? 
 
Westall and Chalkley (2007:17) argue: 
„In order to fully grasp the implications of these visions and realise the 
potential of social enterprise, we need to break out of our usual ways of 
looking at the world, particularly about the „natural‟ business model or the 
narrow but hugely powerful concepts and implications of mainstream 
economics‟  
This paper answers that call and attempts to break away from our usual ways of looking at the world. 
Ethical capital certainly provides an alternative view to the traditions of mainstream economics. 
What we have attempted to unpack is the current conceptualisation of social enterprise and the 
current concept of ethical capital in the literature to date. The paper has outlined the three levels of 
moral agency as well as a fourth and fifth level that takes the concept to its natural end. It is here this 
paper moves the debate on and offers the social enterprise a more radical frame of reference.  
 
The neo-classical economic paradigm has a conceptualisation and pre-occupation with economic life 
as a search for equilibrium (Clark 1936). This search for the natural order of wealth, returns, 
production, etc. formulates economic organisation as those things that could be measured and 
controlled.  This subsequently led the „political economists‟ to exclude those things outside rational 
economics as non-economic (Kapp, 1950). Hence, as Becker (1976) suggests, all decisions are 
economic. Thegiven, then, is that private enterprise behaves to achieve rationality and efficiency 
(Shaw 1997).   
 
It has been argued that the current ideology of the neo-classical economic paradigm pursues interests 
towards the self and towards the erosion of the moral basis of association. The outcome leaves 
society with a problem of low ethical virtue. The rise of corporate social responsibility in both social 
and environmental terms is slowly beginning to address and meet people‟s desire for a more moral 
way of living. This boundary shift in the rules of the game offers some hope but as the taste buds are 
introduced to these virtues, the current menu of the day lacks enough ethical nutrition. Further to 
this, once tasted, society desires more and more. And so an ever increasing desire for satisfying the 
ethical taste buds is stimulated. It is only through the social enterprise movement that there is a 
sufficient supply of ethical capital to satisfy the appetite. Doherty et al. (2009) go as far to suggest 
that social enterprise is a vehicle for moral management. So when Tim Smit suggests „corporate life 
as we know it going to be dead in thirty years time‟ this might be the symptom of a changing appetite 
for a more moral, virtuous and ethical lifestyle. In Eden, this may be why Tim Smit has been able to 
recruit the top executives that he has.  Is the decamping set to continue?  Is the social enterprise 
movement awake to this? Is the movement ready to capitalise on such a paradigm shift?  
 
This paradigm shift may well need to happen sooner rather than later, as the drive of a market and 
managerialist culture is set to infest the sector. Concern about market opportunities are well 
documented in other works, but we have focused on the tensions of such an agenda and the 
potentially catastrophic consequences this has for the social and ethical capital foundations in 
society. As Keller (2007:172) warns; 
“What has been lost of Adam Smith in the translation to neoclassical economics 
is the basis of morality and control that Smith envisioned would go hand-in-hand 
with market efficiency and that the goal of an economy must be the greater 
economic welfare of the society. In short, efficiency is not an end in itself.” 
Further research is called for. If the social enterprise movement can widen the conceptualisation 
away from business and revenue to one that incorporates a view of fostering ethical capital, might 
this help re-frame and achieve the radical changes advocated by Bornstein (2004), Drayton (2005) 
and Emerson and Bonini (2004)?  We think so. 
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